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Limitations on Choice: 
Abortion for Women with Diminished Capacity
Elizabeth Ann McCaman* 
In October 2011, a thirty-two-year-old mentally ill woman in 
Massachusetts, referred to as “Mary Moe,” learned she was pregnant.1  
Mary’s parents, who were already caring for her five-year old son due to 
her schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, sought court permission for an 
abortion.2  In a December hearing, the Department of Mental Health 
applied for temporary guardianship of Mary Moe on behalf of Mary’s 
parents, which would allow her parents to consent to an abortion for their 
daughter.3  In January 2012, Norfolk County Probate and Family Court 
Judge Christina L. Harms approved the guardianship and ordered Mary 
Moe be “coaxed, bribed, or even enticed . . . by ruse” to abort her 
pregnancy and undergo sterilization.4  Judge Harms abruptly retired 
following her controversial decision.5   
An appellate panel subsequently overturned the orders, stating, “In 
ordering sterilization sua sponte and without notice, the probate judge 
failed to provide the basic due process that is constitutionally required.”6  
The panel also remanded the abortion order back to the lower court, 
concerned that Judge Harms essentially ignored a court-commissioned 
report that found Mary would decide against an abortion if she had the 
* Executive Articles Editor, 2012–2013, Hastings Women's Law Journal; J.D.
Candidate, 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Political 
Science, Loyola Marymount University, 2010.  Thank you to the Center for Reproductive 
Rights and A Is For, for supporting my belief that reproductive rights are human rights; 
Professor Jennifer Dunn, for providing the inspiration for this note topic; Eric Shuffle, for 
continually proving to me that feminists and men are more compatible than the world 
thinks; and to my sister Christine, for putting a face on a generation of women in need of 
support, justice, and vindication.  
1. John Zaremba, Parents’ Petition To Force Ill Daughter’s Abortion Withdrawn, 
BOSTON HERALD (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg? 
articleid=1400264&srvc=rss. 
2. Id.
3. John Zaremba et al., Decision Blasts Judge’s Order To Force Abortion, BOSTON 
HERALD (Jan. 18, 2012), http://bostonherald.com/news/regional/view/20220118decision_ 
blasts_judges_order_to_force_abortion_ruling_to_coax_mentally_ill_woman_sparks_outrage. 
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capacity.7  During the remand proceedings, and after significant press, 
Mary’s parents withdrew their court petition.8 
This real-life scenario highlights the issues presented when a woman 
with diminished capacity9 or her court-appointed guardian10 seeks an 
abortion.  If she cannot give informed consent, the usual prerequisite for 
performing an abortion, should her guardian be able to give the informed 
consent?  Should a court?  What if she does not have a court-appointed 
guardian?  Who should make that decision?  Should she be forced to carry 
the pregnancy to term?  This paper will address those questions.  It will 
argue that women with diminished capacity11 should have access to 
abortion, provided there are statutory or case law protections to avoid 
abuse.  Great deference should be given to “substituted judgment,” with a 
“best interests” standard used only when the woman’s intent cannot be 
discerned from her or her guardian.  
Despite a long and storied history of abuse of eugenics programs 
targeting the disabled,12 there are many public policy reasons why states 
7. Zaremba, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Capacity is the mental ability to understand the nature and effect of one’s acts.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 235 (9th ed. 2009).  Diminished capacity is an impaired mental 
condition, short of insanity, that prevents a person from having the mental state necessary to 
be held responsible for his or her actions.  Id.  Capacity is often confused with competency, 
which is vaguely defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “the mental ability to understand 
problems and make decisions.”  Id. at 322.  Capacity is a medical term that assesses an 
individual’s abilities at a specific moment in time.  Alec Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal 
Competency and Consent to Treatment, 97 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 415, 415 (Sept. 2004). 
Competence is a legal term that has implications beyond the specific moment in time, 
because it prevents an incompetent person from making any treatment decisions until 
subsequently adjudged competent.  Id.  A judge determines competency, while a doctor 
determines capacity.  Id. 
10. There are many ways in which a third party may gain legal authority over another’s
healthcare decisions.  The most common are guardianship, conservatorship, surrogacy, and 
advanced directives.  Surrogacy and advanced directives are generally used for people who 
once had capacity but are now incapacitated, for example due to illness or an accident. 
Guardianship is the typical term used to describe a person court-appointed to represent, in 
different forms depending on the individual ward, a permanently incapacitated person.  In 
California the term used is conservatorship.  Unless discussing California, this paper will 
use the term guardianship.  This paper will focus on court-appointed representation (i.e., 
guardianships and conservatorships), and does not address abortion for women with 
surrogates or advanced directives. 
11. For the purposes of this paper, “diminished capacity” refers to a woman who is
medically and legally unable to give informed consent to abortion. 
12. The specific examples of diminished capacity in this paper feature women with
intellectual disabilities and women with mental illness.  Nonetheless, these terms should not 
be confused.  Mental illness can, but is not always, a fluctuating state of mind, not related to 
intelligence in any way.  E-mail from Melissa Nau, Med. Dir., Psychiatric Emergency 
Servs., S.F. Gen. Hosp., Assistant Clinical Professor, Univ. Cal., S.F. (Sept. 16, 2012, 01:45 
PST) (on file with author).  Intellectual disability is generally a consistent and permanent 
state of mind clearly related to IQ.  Id.  For both groups of women, her state of mind at the 
time of the incident or procedure in question determines whether or not she has diminished 
capacity and cannot give informed consent to an abortion.  Id. 
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should support access to abortion for women with diminished capacity.  In 
In re D.W., a severely intellectually disabled13 woman’s guardian was not 
authorized to consent to abortion on behalf of the ward, and so sought court 
authority.14  The woman’s doctors testified that in their medical opinions, 
abortion was the best option.15  Because of her diminished capacity, D.W. 
was unable to understand the dynamics of being pregnant, including the 
importance of diet and exercise, as well as the need to avoid physical 
injury.16  Her doctors also hypothesized that should she be forced to 
continue the pregnancy, D.W. would likely be unable to understand any of 
the baby’s needs once it was born.17  While an abortion was not medically 
necessary (i.e., the pregnancy did not pose a risk to her physical health), the 
doctors hypothesized pregnancy would be extremely damaging to D.W.’s 
emotional health.18  Additionally, because of the limitations of diminished 
capacity, taking regular birth control may be unfeasible, making access to 
abortion even more critical.19  Cases dealing with mental capacity are very 
fact specific; however, these same limitations can be imputed to many 
cases of pregnant women with diminished capacity.20  
This paper will begin by exploring what the term “informed consent” 
really means and why it is not possible for some women with limited 
capacity to give informed consent to medical health care treatment, 
including abortion.  It will also explore if such a woman’s intentions can be 
discerned despite the fact that she does not meet the standard for informed 
consent.  It will then discuss the history of sterilization and abortion abuse 
as well as sexual abuse for intellectually disabled women, hypothesizing 
that some political advocates and judges may be opposed to abortion for 
these women under any circumstance because of the potential for misuse. 
 Next this paper will move into the actual practices of three states with 
regard to women with diminished capacity and reproductive rights. 
Florida, New York, and California were chosen for their diversity in 
approach.  Florida has a well-established court process to allow women 
with diminished capacity to terminate their pregnancies.  New York allows 
a parent or guardian to consent on behalf of a woman with diminished 
capacity who is using the services of the Department of Mental Hygiene 
without involving the court.  In California, if a woman with diminished 
capacity has a conservator, the conservator may consent to surgical 
13. In this case the court used the term “mentally retarded.”  In re D.W., 481 N.E.2d 355,
355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).  For clarity, this paper will use the term “intellectually disabled,” 
regardless of court or statutory language. 
14. Id.




19. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 773 (Cal. 1985).
20. Id.
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procedures and general medical treatment on her behalf if she does not 
object, although some statutes suggest petitioning the court may be 
prudent.  This paper will conclude by making policy recommendations 
based on the findings and analyses of all three state approaches.   
I. INFORMED CONSENT AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
STANDARD 
Informed consent is a medical and legal concept that establishes the 
rules regarding patient medical decision-making.21  In this context, 
informed consent is defined as “[a] patient’s knowing choice about a 
medical treatment or procedure, made after a physician or other healthcare 
provider discloses whatever information a reasonably prudent provider in 
the medical community would give to a patient regarding the risks involved 
in the proposed treatment or procedure.”22  The rule of informed consent 
rejects a paternalistic model of patient decision-making in which the 
physician alone decides what is in the best interest of the patient.23  Instead, 
the informed consent model recognizes that cognizant adults have the 
capacity to make their own medical treatment decisions.24  However, 
patients who are unaware of or incapable of understanding the risks, 
benefits, and alternatives to a particular treatment cannot give informed 
consent.25  The standards governing the ability to give consent are usually 
determined by the severity of the incapacity.26  Doctors consider whether 
the patient is able to weigh the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the 
proposed treatment.27  Does she understand the procedure?  Can she 
articulate the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the procedure?28  Can she 
manipulate this information rationally?29  Can she communicate a clear and 
consistent choice?30  This paper is directed at women with diminished 
capacity who cannot fully understand the abortion procedure and do not 
have the requisite mental capacity to give informed consent. 
In making medical treatment decisions for patients with diminished 
capacity, guardians and courts use either a substituted judgment or best 
21. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 235 (2009). 
22. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009).
23. Manian, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 237.
26. Daniel Pollack et al., The Capacity of a Mentally Retarded Person to Consent: An
American and Jewish Legal Perspective, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 197, 198 
(2000). 
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interests standard.31  A substituted judgment standard asks the question: 
“What would the woman decide if she had capacity?”32  A best interests 
standard asks the question: “What decision best serves the woman’s 
interests?”33  Which standard to use is decided on a case-by-case basis, 
usually dependent on the statutory scheme or relevant case law.34  In 
addition, substituted judgment itself sometimes includes within it a best 
interests standard.35  A guardian or court’s judgment is likely to be formed, 
at least in part, by what is felt to be best for the woman in its charge.36 
For women who never had capacity, it is difficult to use substituted 
judgment because there is little to no indication of preference, which could 
guide a guardian in making the decision.37  When possible, best interests 
should also take into account the communicated preferences of the woman, 
enhancing her autonomy.38  Even in cases of women determined 
permanently incompetent or women who never had capacity, it is possible 
for them to express their opinions, even regarding such complicated issues 
as pregnancy.  In In re Moe, a pregnant woman with intellectual disabilities 
addressed the court and clearly stated her desire to have an abortion.39  
Having had three previous abortions and currently having a two-year-old 
child, she articulated familiarity with the procedure and a desire to not have 
any more children.40  In Lefebvre v. North Broward Hospital District, a 
woman stopped taking her antipsychotic medication in an effort not to hurt 
her fetus.41  This may be an indication that she did not want to terminate the 
pregnancy.  If a woman with diminished capacity, however, gives 
conflicting statements, it may not be possible to use any remnant of 
substituted judgment and instead the legal authority can rely only on the 
best interests standard.   
II. HISTORY OF STERILIZATION AND ABUSE FOR
WOMEN WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
In Washington v. Glucksberg, an assisted suicide case, the Supreme 
Court declared that states have an interest in protecting vulnerable groups, 
including the poor, elderly, and disabled, from abuse, neglect, and 
31. Catherine M. French, Note, Protecting the “Right” To Choose of Women Who Are
Incompetent: Ethical, Doctrinal, and Practical Arguments Against Fetal Representation, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 519 (2005). 
32. Id.
33. French, supra note 31.
34. Pollack et al., supra note 26, at 200.
35. Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making: Defining the Best
Interests of Never-Competent Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 159–60 (2005). 
36. Id.
37. French, supra note 31, at 519.
38. Id.
39. In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
40. Id. at 684–85.
41. Lefebvre v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 566 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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mistakes.42  It recognized the real risk of subtle coercion and undue 
influence to which these vulnerable groups are most susceptible.43  
However, the United States has not always upheld that ideal.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, many states enacted laws 
authorizing the sterilization of intellectually disabled people believed to be 
societal burdens.44  These laws were based on the theory of eugenics, 
positing that intelligence is genetically and racially based and therefore 
“predictably inherited by children from their parents.”45  Eugenics seeks to 
remedy the continuation of low-intelligence, and thereby protect and 
improve society, by preventing reproduction by those who might produce 
defective offspring.46 
In 1927, the Court upheld a Virginia sterilization law for the “feeble-
minded” as constitutional.47  Justice Holmes famously wrote, in an opinion 
validating eugenics: 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind . . . Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough.48 
While this opinion seems insensitive and appalling now, it reflects the 
societal understanding at the time of the intellectually disabled population’s 
best interest. 
Near the second half of the twentieth century, science and society 
began to reject eugenics.49  Courts and legislatures developed a heightened 
awareness of reproductive privacy in general, including for the 
intellectually disabled.50  A movement developed toward deinstitutional-
ization and normalization, preferring independence and respect for 
autonomy.51  Society slowly grew more comfortable with sexual expression 
and activity by intellectually disabled adults.  World War II also played a 
role in discrediting eugenics.  Reports of widespread sterilization in Nazi 
Germany led to increased criticism of similar practices in the United 
States.52  In 1942, the court held the sterilization of habitual criminals 
42. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
43. Id. at 732.
44. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights
and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 809. 
45. Id.
46. Id. at 809–10.
47. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).
48. Id. at 207.
49. French, supra note 31, at 527.
50. Id. at 528.
51. Id.
52. Scott, supra note 44, at 811.
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violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53  By 
the 1960s, involuntary sterilization was generally understood to be an 
unjustified intrusion by the state on liberty and privacy.54  As a result, many 
states passed laws setting out strict guidelines for sterilization of the 
intellectually disabled in order to guard against possible abuses.55  Notably 
absent from many of these provisions were guidelines on abortion for 
intellectually disabled women, or guidelines for women who may not be 
intellectually disabled but have diminished capacity nonetheless.  
The intellectually disabled population is also uniquely vulnerable to 
sexual abuse.56  Rape is a widely accepted justification for abortion for 
women with full capacity, rationalizing that women should not be forced to 
carry a constant reminder of their traumatic assault.  Similarly, women with 
intellectual disabilities should not be forced into pregnancy because of the 
criminal actions of others.  It is therefore important that this population of 
women have access to safe and legal abortion.57  
III. FLORIDA
Florida has an enumerated statutory policy establishing the rights and 
legal limitations for intellectually disabled persons, in addition to a well-
established court process to permit women with diminished capacity to 
terminate their pregnancies.   
Florida has an explicit right of privacy written into its state 
constitution.58  Florida statutes also specifically state that a person with 
intellectual disabilities retains the right to privacy.59  An intellectually 
disabled person retains the right to be treated humanely, with dignity and 
respect, protected against abuse and neglect, to be properly educated, and 
to be free from discrimination because of his or her incapacity.60  Florida 
embraces the “normalization” principle.61  This means the intellectually 
disabled obtain an existence as close to normal as possible, making 
available patterns and conditions of everyday life that resemble the typical 
53. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
54. Scott, supra note 44, at 811.
55. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958 (West 2012).
56. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004); Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 
315, 316. 
57. If society is uncomfortable with abortion for this population, one of the best ways to
reduce its prevalence is to provide greater protections from sexual abuse for these 
vulnerable women.  However, abuse is not the only reason intellectually disabled women 
need access to abortion.  It is the position of this paper that people with intellectual 
disabilities retain a right to sexual autonomy.  The freedom to have sex necessarily 
encompasses the freedom to exercise full reproductive options, including abortion. 
58. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.13 (West 2010).
60. Id.
61. State Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Lee, 665 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995). 
 
162 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:1 
patterns of mainstream society.62  Presumably, this includes reproductive 
privacy.63  The intent behind this legislation is to prioritize services “that 
will enable individuals with [intellectual] disabilities to achieve their 
greatest potential for independent and productive living.”64 
While there is no explicit right to reproductive freedom retained by an 
incapacitated person, Florida defines the right of education to include 
education in sex, marriage, and family planning.65  A person determined 
incapacitated also retains the right to marry, which implies 
consummation.66  If the person has been deemed incapable of contracting, 
this right is subject to court approval but may not be delegated to a 
guardian.67  Florida takes a similar stance of seeking court approval for 
reproductive rights to sterilization and abortion.68 
 Florida law explicitly references abortion for women with diminished 
capacity and the court mechanism for obtaining such an abortion.  In 1989, 
Florida enacted two statutes which state that a guardian may not consent on 
behalf of the ward to the performance of a sterilization or abortion 
procedure without first obtaining specific court authority.69  The legislature 
enacted these laws with the purpose of promoting a public welfare system 
that permits incapacitated persons to participate as fully as possible in all 
decisions affecting them, assists such persons in maintaining their physical 
health and safety, protects their rights, and interferes the least with the legal 
capacity of a person to act on his or her own behalf.70  Under the statutes, 
court procedure after receiving a petition for an abortion is very specific.71  
First, the court must appoint an independent attorney to act on the woman’s 
behalf.72  The attorney must meet with the woman and have the opportunity 
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at any relevant court 
hearing.73  Second, there must be an independent medical, psychological, 
and social evaluation of the woman by a competent professional, which 
serves as evidence for the court.74  Third, the court must personally meet 
with the woman to obtain its own impression of her capacity, so as to 
afford her full opportunity to express her personal views or desires 
regarding the possible abortion (reminiscent of substituted judgment).75  
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.063 (West 2010).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 393.13.
66. Id. § 744.3215(2)(a).
67. Id.
68. Id. §§ 744.3215, 744.3725.
69. Id.; see also 1989 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 89-96 (West).
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.1012; 1989 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 89-96 (West).
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3725.
72. Id. § 744.3725(1).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 744.3725(2).
75. Id. § 744.3725(3).
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Fourth, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that she in 
fact lacks the capacity to give informed consent to an abortion, and that 
capacity is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.76  Finally, the 
court must be persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the abortion 
would be in her best interest.77  Once the woman’s guardian obtains court 
authority, he or she must give written informed consent to the abortion 
provider.78   
Florida has applied its statutory scheme in two major cases.  The first is 
the case of Denise Lefebvre, a woman who had a history of mental illness 
and suffered from manic depression and psychosis.79  She was prescribed 
the medication lithium to control her illness, but she stopped taking the 
medication when she suspected she might be pregnant.80  In July 1990, Ms. 
Lefebvre was admitted to the hospital for severe psychosis.81  
Subsequently, the hospital filed a petition with the court seeking authority 
to terminate Ms. Lefebvre’s pregnancy.82  The hospital alleged that without 
the use of lithium Ms. Lefebvre was violent, abusive, aggressive and 
uncontrollable, but it could not administer any lithium because of the 
harmful effects to the fetus.83  It felt an abortion would be in the best 
interests of both Ms. Lefebvre and the fetus.84  Ms. Lefebvre’s father, who 
the court appointed her guardian advocate during earlier involuntary 
placement proceedings, supported the court petition.85   
The court heard testimony that despite her erratic behavior without the 
lithium, such as attempting to place pieces of plaster in her vagina and eat 
her feces, Ms. Lefebvre did not want any medication to hurt the baby she 
intended to keep.86  Nonetheless, the trial court judge approved the petition 
for termination of the pregnancy without personally meeting with Ms. 
Lefebvre, claiming the abortion was in her and the fetus’ best interests.87 
On appeal, the appellate court chastised the trial court for not following 
the clearly delineated procedures laid out in statute.88  First, the court did 
not meet with Ms. Lefebvre personally, the aspect of the statute designed to 
protect substituted judgment.89  Under these facts, substituted judgment 
shows Ms. Lefebvre, if she had capacity, may not have chosen an 
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3725(4).
77. Id. § 744.3725(5).
78. Id. § 390.0111(3).






85. Id. at 569–70.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 570–71.
88. Id. at 571.
89. Id. at 571.
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abortion.90  The appellate court, however, contrary to the legislative intent, 
concluded that substituted judgment was not applicable in this case.91  Past 
substituted judgment cases had involved patients suffering from 
immediately life-threatening, terminal, or incurable medical conditions, 
conditions not present in this case.92  Nonetheless, the failure of the trial 
court to follow specific procedure was enough to overturn the prior court 
approval.93  The appellate court stated that in order for such a proceeding to 
be approved in the future, Ms. Lefebvre must be adjudicated incapacitated, 
a guardian must be specifically appointed due to this incapacitation, and the 
guardian then could attempt to obtain court authority for an abortion 
following proper statutory procedure.94 
Another prominent Florida case that addresses this issue is In re 
Guardianship of J.D.S.95  J.D.S. was a twenty-two-year-old pregnant 
woman suffering from severe intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, autism 
and seizure disorder, and she was unable to adequately provide for her own 
care and protection.96  Like Ms. Lefebvre, J.D.S. was on numerous 
medications that could be detrimental to her fetus.97  The Florida 
Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) filed a petition with 
the court requesting appointment of a guardian ad litem98 for J.D.S. and a 
separate guardian for the fetus, oddly suggesting an adversarial legal 
relationship between a mother and fetus.99  Following proper statutory 
procedure in regard to J.D.S., the court appointed an attorney for J.D.S. and 
appointed a committee to determine if J.D.S. was incapacitated.100  It 
90. Lefebvre, 566 So. 2d at 569–70.  Nonetheless, the court opinion does not provide
enough information for an independent doctor to determine post hoc the extent of Ms. 
Lefebvre’s diminished capacity.  E-mail from Melissa Nau, supra, note 12.  She does not 
automatically lack capacity simply because she is having a manic episode.  Id.  A doctor 
would need to know more about her beliefs in the moment about her pregnancy and 
abortion.  E-mail from Melissa Nau, supra, note 12.  People in acutely decompensated 
psychiatric states can still be found to have capacity in some situations.  Id.  Additionally, it 
is unclear exactly why she stopped taking her medication.  Id.  The case hypothesizes that 
she did so in order to protect her fetus, but it could have been because of some other 
psychotic belief (e.g., the fetus is an alien growing inside of her that would enlighten her). 
Id.  All of these facts should be considered in determining how much weight to give her 
decision to terminate medication. 




95. In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
96. Id. at 536.
97. Id.
98. A guardian ad litem has no affiliation with an institution or the parents or guardian,
but is appointed independently by a court to assist it in making a judgment.  Susan Stefan, 
Whose Egg Is It Anyway? Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized and 
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declined to appoint an emergency temporary guardian for J.D.S. or her 
fetus at that time, stating J.D.S. was not then in danger.101 
The main issue involved in this case was fetal guardianship.102  In an 
unusual petition, Jennifer Wixtrom, wife of a Florida state attorney and of 
no relation to J.D.S. or her family, subsequently requested to be appointed 
guardian of J.D.S.’s fetus, alleging that appointment was essential because 
J.D.S. lacked the mental capacity to provide proper prenatal care.103
Wixtrom also expressed concern that J.D.S.’s guardian, who was under
fiduciary duty to J.D.S. but not the fetus, might choose to initiate abortion
proceedings.104  The State of Florida and DCF filed an amicus brief in
support of Wixtrom’s petition, indicating Florida seeks to discourage
abortion for women with diminished capacity, despite specifically allowing
for it in statute.105  Nonetheless, the court denied the petition, concluding
that fetal guardianship was improper.106  The court noted that Florida law
provides safeguards to ensure that a guardian does not act capriciously or
cavalierly when considering the health of pregnant woman with diminished
capacity and her fetus.107  Fetal guardianship to protect against abortion
was unnecessary and repetitive considering the extremely high standard
that must be met in order for a woman such as J.D.S. to have an abortion.108
The benefit of a statutory scheme such as Florida’s is in its clarity.  The 
process is laid out in specific detail in statutes and is further explicated by 
case law.  The downside of the court process is its complication.  As 
illustrated in Lefebvre, one small deviation from the long list underlying the 
process may be grounds for reversal of authorization for abortion. 
Additionally, the Florida process seems timeconsuming and expensive. 
The court has to meet with the woman, hear testimony from witnesses, and 
hire an expert for the woman’s independent assessment.  While abortion is 
a safe procedure, it is the safest the earlier in a pregnancy it is performed.109  
Florida needs to implement an expedited process to hear such petitions to 
ensure this process is not placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.110   
101. Stefan, supra note 98, at 436.
102. Id.
103. J.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 536, 543 n.4 (Pleus, J. dissenting).
104. Id. at 539.




109. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 339 (3d Cir. 1987).
110. Under Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, if a state abortion scheme places a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, it is unconstitutional as
infringing on a woman’s liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  505 U.S 833, 834, 837 (1992).
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IV. NEW YORK
Like Florida, New York also has layers of regulations, dating from the 
1970s, explicitly addressing the reproductive rights of the intellectually 
disabled, including the right to abortion.111  The consent provisions do not 
explicitly include abortion, but the court has interpreted the “surgery and 
major medical treatment” provision to cover abortion.112  Unlike Florida, 
New York allows a parent or guardian to consent on behalf of a woman 
with intellectual disabilities without involving the court.  However, New 
York’s provisions only apply to women receiving services for intellectual 
disability and do not address women who have diminished capacity for 
another reason. 
New York adopted regulations regarding the quality of care and 
treatment for patients in mental health facilities.113  They were intended to 
promote patients’ rights to an individual program “which maximizes their 
abilities to cope with their environment, will foster social and vocational 
competence and will enable them to live as independently as possible.”114  
The regulations also promote patients’ rights to a maximum amount of 
privacy.115  Facilities governed by the Department of Mental Hygiene, 
including hospitals and schools, must provide family planning education 
and services for all patients.116  Contraception is available upon request to 
any patient who is sixteen or older, is the parent of a child, or is married.117  
Contraception is available to a patient under sixteen at the discretion of the 
facility and the patient’s guardian.118  Information about contraception is 
available to all patients no matter their age.119  Sterilization is more strictly 
regulated, likely because of its permanency.120  No sterilization shall be 
performed until reviewed and approved by a medical review board 
independent of the facility appointed by the regional director.121  In regard 
to pregnancy, “each patient has the same right to carry a pregnancy to term 
as any other citizen.  Moreover, each patient has the same right to abortion 
as any other citizen.”122 
111. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.6, 27.8, 27.9 (2012).
112. In re Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d 137, 138 (N.Y. 1984).
113. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.2(a)–(b).  These regulations apply to any
person receiving services for the intellectually disabled at any facility, including a school, in
which services for the intellectually disabled are provided.  Id.  This covers nonresidential
and residential facilities, including residence at a school.  Id.
114. Id. § 27.1(b).
115. Id. § 27.1(e).
116. Id. §§ 27.2(a), 27.6(a).
117. Id. § 27.6(a)(2).
118. Id. § 27.6(a)(3).
119. Id. § 27.6(a)(1).




Winter 2013] LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE 167 
New York has a clearly delineated regulatory and statutory process to 
obtain consent for an abortion, falling under the category of surgery or 
major medical treatment.123  The process gives wide discretion to family 
members to exercise judgment on the woman’s behalf.124  If the patient is 
under eighteen, she must obtain consent from her parents or legal 
guardian.125  If parental or guardian consent is unavailable, the medical 
director may not initiate the abortion procedure without court authorization, 
except in emergency situations where there is significant danger to life or 
limb of the patient if the procedure is delayed.126  If the patient is eighteen 
or older, she must obtain authorization from her spouse, a parent, an adult 
child, or a court of competent jurisdiction.127  Again, this does not apply to 
emergency situations.128  If a patient’s mental capacity is unclear, an 
independent opinion must be obtained from a qualified consultant who is 
not an employee of the facility.129  All patients also retain the right of 
objection and appeal to the procedure, no matter their mental capacity or 
age.130 
In In re Barbara C., a mental health facility petitioned the court to 
perform an abortion on Barbara C., a twenty-five-year-old patient with the 
mental age of two.131  After a hearing, the Special Term court concluded 
that Barbara C. was incapable of giving informed consent to the procedure 
and relied upon the consent of her father.132  The patient’s guardian ad 
litem filed an appeal on behalf of Barbara C., even though the abortion had 
already been performed.  He argued that the court erred in relying solely on 
the consent of her father and should have instead determined whether an 
abortion would be in her best interest.133  Mental Health Information 
Service also argued the court should determine what Barbara C. herself 
would have done if she had capacity (substituted judgment).134  The court 
123. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.9; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03
(McKinney 2011).
124. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.9.
125. Id. § 27.9(a).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 27.9(b).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 27.9(c).
130. Id. § 27.8.  New York institutions also provide an outlet for religious preference of
patients.  Patients held on involuntary status may not be given treatment over their religious
objection, if the objection is based on an assertion that the treatment is in conflict with a
religious belief of the patient, unless there is a court order.  Id. § 27.8(b)(3)(ii).  This could
limit unwanted abortion for patients whose religion opposes abortion.  This procedure
validates substituted judgment and protects against abortion abuse by guardians and mental
health professionals.  It also fulfills the regulatory intent to acknowledge and respect a
patient’s cultural identity, although it may raise separate First Amendment issues as to what
a bona fide religious objection requires.  Id. § 27.1(d).
131. In re Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d 137, 137–38 (N.Y. 1984).
132. Id. at 138.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 138–39.
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rejected this argument and stood by the regulations, maintaining that 
parental consent was the sole necessary factor in approving the abortion.135  
The Court found it improper for a judge to invoke his or her own moral, 
philosophical, theological, and sociological precepts in deciding whether 
the operation should take place.136  The only role of the court is to resolve 
any dispute that may arise concerning the patient’s capacity to give 
consent.137 
The New York approach is extremely efficient.  A guardian does not 
have to waste time by petitioning the court.  This allows for an expedited 
process and does not run the risk of the legal system impermissibly 
delaying abortion.  It also recognizes the importance of family to the 
intellectually disabled patient.138  The woman’s family should know her 
preferences and values and is, therefore, in the best position to effectuate 
the woman’s right to reproductive privacy.139  However, the family may 
have conflicting interests in deciding whether or not to authorize the 
procedure.140  If Barbara C. had given birth, the child would almost 
certainly not have remained in her custody.  Likely, the responsibility of 
raising the child would fall to her parents, which may have influenced her 
father’s decision to terminate the pregnancy.141  Given that conflict, some 
judicial safeguard seems appropriate, including the appointment of an 
impartial and independent guardian ad litem for the intellectually disabled 
woman.   
Additionally, the New York regulations only apply to women receiving 
services from facilities governed by the Department of Mental Hygiene. 
For intellectually disabled women in New York who are independent 
enough to function without state treatment services but who are not capable 
of making all legal and medical decisions, it is unclear how to proceed.  It 
is also unclear how to proceed for women who have diminished capacity 
for a reason other than intellectual disability.  Women like Mary Moe or 
Ms. Lefebvre, for example, would have no avenue for an abortion under 
New York law.  New York would benefit from a more comprehensive 
statute or a further explication through case law. 
V. CALIFORNIA
California does not have any statutes explicitly addressing consent to 
abortion for women with diminished capacity, instead relying on general 
135. Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d at 139.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Elaine B. Krasik, The Role of the Family in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent
Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 539, 573
(1987).
139. Id.
140. Stefan, supra note 98, at 435–36.
141. Id.
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statutes authorizing consent by conservators.142  California also lacks case 
law specific to consent for abortion, but guidance can be discerned from 
sterilization case law, which presents similar arguments regarding the 
extent of a woman’s reproductive rights if she has diminished capacity.143  
Given that California law does not explicitly reference abortion, it is not 
clear whether the general medical treatment provisions, or the more 
specific sterilization provisions, are intended to provide conservators the 
right to authorize abortion on a conservatee’s behalf. 
California Probate Code Division 4 defines generally conservatorship 
and guardianship (for juveniles).  A conservator may be appointed by the 
court in three situations.144  First, one may be appointed if the adult is 
unable to provide properly for his or her personal needs for physical health, 
food, clothing, or shelter.145  Second, a conservator may be appointed if a 
person is substantially unable to manage his or her own financial resources 
or resist fraud or undue influence.146  Finally, intellectually disabled adults 
may be appointed limited conservators.  The appointment of limited 
conservators is appropriate in situations where an adult is able to take care 
of his or her own basic needs, but needs guidance on specific matters for 
which the limited conservator is appointed, such as healthcare decisions or 
financial management.147 
The Legislature codified its intentions behind Division 4 in Probate 
Code section 1950, recognizing the fundamental right of disabled persons 
to exercise choice over matters of procreation.148  Section 1950 specifically 
acknowledges that some persons with intellectual disabilities are capable of 
engaging in consensual sexual activity but incapable of giving “informed, 
voluntary consent necessary to their fully exercising the right to procreative 
choice, which includes the right to choose sterilization.”149   
This intent appears facially to be in direct conflict with Probate Code 
section 4652, which states that absent a medical emergency, the Health 
Care Decisions Law does not authorize consent to commitment to or 
placement in a mental health treatment facility, convulsive treatment, 
142. In California, conservatorship is the typical term used to describe a person court-
appointed to represent, in different forms depending on the individual conservatee, a person
with diminished capacity.
 143. It is important to keep in mind that sterilization is a permanent procedure and
therefore not completely analogous to abortion.  Tubal Ligation Definition, MAYO CLINIC
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/tubal-ligation/MY01000.  Abortion, when
performed correctly, does not prevent a woman from becoming pregnant in the future.
Roger W. Harms, M.D., Abortion: Does It Affect Subsequent Pregnancies? MAYO CLINIC
(Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/abortion/AN00633.




148. Id. § 1950.
149. Id.
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psychosurgery, sterilization, or abortion on behalf of a patient (emphasis 
added).150  While this statute is not located in the conservatorship section of 
the law, it still casts doubt on whether a conservator can authorize an 
abortion for his or her conservatee.  Additionally, even if this statute is not 
intended to prohibit conservator authorization, its mere existence may chill 
a woman’s right to reproductive freedom.   
In order to understand the context and meaning of Probate Code 
section 4652, it is necessary to look at the Probate Code more broadly.  The 
code deals with mental incapacity and healthcare decisions in Division 4: 
Guardianship, Conservatorship, & Other Proceedings, and Division 4.7: 
Health Care Decisions.  Division 4.7 primarily concerns the creation, form, 
and revocation of advance healthcare directives.151  Given that Probate 
Code section 4652 appears in Division 4.7, not Division 4, it will likely be 
interpreted as not authorizing an agent or surrogate to order a principal or 
patient to obtain an abortion.152  Nonetheless, without specific statutory 
guidance, it is unclear how a woman and her conservator should go about 
obtaining the procedure. 
Probate Code section 2354 states that a conservator may consent to 
medical treatment if the conservatee does not object.153  Additionally, “the 
conservator may require the conservatee to receive medical treatment, 
whether or not the conservatee consents to the treatment, if a court order 
specifically authorizing the medical treatment has been obtained.”154  
Section 2357 repeats the need for the court, stating that if a conservatee 
requires unauthorized medical treatment and the conservatee is unable to 
give informed consent, the conservator may petition the court.155  The 
California Welfare & Institutions Code, governing all mental health 
facilities, also suggests in the case of an abortion that it would be 
appropriate for a court to intervene.156  Section 5358 states that no surgery 
shall be performed upon a conservatee without the conservatee’s prior 
consent or a specific court order authorization, except in emergency 
cases.157  Section 5358.2 repeats the Probate Code’s assertion that if a 
conservatee requires medical treatment and the conservator has not been 
specifically authorized to require the conservatee to receive the medical 
treatment, the conservator shall obtain a court order.158  Despite the 
legislature’s expression that a court is an improper venue for healthcare 
150. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4652 (West 2012).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 2354.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 2357.
156. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5358–5358.2 (West 2012).
157. Id. § 5358.
158. Id. § 5358.2.
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decisions,159 these statutes suggest that if the woman objects to an abortion, 
or possibly even if she does not but the conservator has doubts about his or 
her medical authority, petitioning the court may be prudent.  Additionally, 
if a woman with diminished capacity does not have a court-appointed 
conservator, petitioning the court may be the only option.  It is unclear in 
that case whether the court would appoint a conservator for the limited 
purpose of consenting to the abortion, or if the court would simply 
authorize the abortion itself.  
Despite these implications, there are no cases in which a woman with 
diminished capacity or her conservator has petitioned the court to obtain 
authorization for an abortion.  Perhaps this is because the system works 
well, or perhaps this is because this area of law has not yet been challenged 
in California court.  However, there have been similar cases in which 
women or their conservators have petitioned for authorization for 
sterilization.   
In 1991, the Legislature added Probate Code section 1958.160  This 
statute sets out factors to be established beyond a reasonable doubt that, 
once established, allow a court to authorize a conservator to consent to 
sterilization for a conservatee.161  This represents a clear legislative intent 
to allow sterilization for women with diminished capacity without the 
urgency of a medical necessity.162  In In re Conservatorship of Angela D., 
the parents and co-conservators of a severely intellectually disabled woman 
petitioned the court for authorization to have their daughter sterilized under 
section 1958.163  The conservatee’s independent legal advocate argued the 
conservators had not sufficiently proven one of the elements of section 
1958, that the conservatee was likely to engage in sexual activity, in light 
of section 1959.164  Section 1959 does not allow the conservatee’s 
vulnerability to sexual abuse to count as proof that the conservatee is likely 
to engage in sexual activity.  It states that: 
The fact that, due to the nature or severity of his or her disability, a 
person for whom an authorization for sterilization is sought may be 
vulnerable to sexual conduct by others that would be deemed 
unlawful, shall not be considered by the court in determining 
whether sterilization is to be authorized.165   
The court determined that section 1959 could not be applied to deny 
the conservators the authorization to consent to the conservatee’s 
sterilization, noting that the court should consider the best interests of the 
159. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1950 (West 2012).
160. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958 (West 2012).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. In re Conservatorship of Angela D., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (Ct. App. 1999).
164. Id. at 1416; CAL. PROB. CODE § 1959 (West 2012).
165. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1959 (West 2012).
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conservatee.166  While the court should be mindful of past abuses of 
sterilization, “ultimately it is the conservatee who must be served by the 
statute.”167  The court authorized the sterilization because the facts of the 
case were so compelling.168  This same individualized approach should be 
used to determine when a court in California should authorize an 
incapacitated woman’s abortion.  While there are no codified factors to 
establish for the court, as there are for sterilization, a court should consider 
the best interests and personal preferences, if discernable, of the woman.169 
California recognizes the importance of having a judicial safeguard in 
place when it comes to abortion for women with diminished capacity. 
Multiple statutes suggest that petitioning through the court is proper, 
certainly if a conservatee objects.170  In addition, declining to separate 
abortion from other medical procedures may be seen as giving it more 
validity.  Under the California system, abortion is considered the same as 
any other medical surgery, despite its political unpopularity. 
Unfortunately, the benefits of the California system are outweighed by its 
vagueness.  If a woman does not have a court-appointed conservator, the 
law gives no guidance for obtaining her abortion.  Without an explicit 
statute governing this area, or an illustration through case law, a woman’s 
right to abortion may be chilled or denied. 
VI. CONCLUSION: POLICY RECOMMENDATION
In developing proper safeguards, it is important to balance the desire 
for reproductive freedom against the need for protection from abuse. 
Women with diminished capacity should enjoy “the same legal rights and 
responsibilities guaranteed all other persons,” one such fundamental right 
being a woman’s right to choose whether to bear children.171  Yet, the 
United States has a history of abuse when it comes to vulnerable 
populations.172  In the past, many women with intellectual disabilities 
underwent forced sterilization under a eugenics theory.173  As a result, 
“courts have been unwilling to give conservators and other guardians free 
rein to substitute their own judgment for that of [intellectually] disabled 
patients in matters affecting reproductive rights.”174  Nonetheless, this fear 
of abuse is not substantial enough to justify depriving women with 
diminished capacity the right to reproductive choice.175 
166. Angela D., 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1424, 1428.
167. Id. at 1428.
168. Id.
169. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958 (West 2012).
170. Id. §§ 1958, 2354, 2357; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5358–5358.2 (West 2012).




175. Id. at 12.
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Looking at the actual practices of three states, there is very little 
consistency.  Florida has a very specific, complex court procedure in place 
to authorize abortion, favoring a best interests model.  In New York, 
abortion can be performed under the Department of Mental Hygiene with 
the consent of a parent or guardian.  In California, conservators can consent 
to surgery and medical treatment on behalf of the conservatee if he or she 
does not object, but it is not clear whether this is meant to apply to 
abortion. 
Ideally, a state policy will be mindful of the goals of clarity, 
individualization, expediency, and oversight.  All states need to implement 
a clear procedure that allows for access to abortion for women with 
diminished capacity.  Without an express mechanism, either from statutes 
or from case law, this effectively denies incapacitated women an integral 
aspect of their reproductive rights.  It may be useful for each state to model 
its policy after any existing guidelines for sterilization, which most states 
already have in place, bearing in mind that abortion is very time sensitive 
while sterilization is often not.  An enumerated and accessible policy is 
necessary to avoid vagueness.  Without an explicit statute governing this 
area, or an illustration through case law, a woman’s right to abortion may 
be chilled or even denied. 
Additionally, an individualized approach should be used to determine 
when a court should or should not authorize an abortion.  There should be 
no codified factors to establish for the court, as there are for sterilization, 
except perhaps as guidelines.  As evidenced in Angela D., codified factors 
may create too much rigidity and not allow enough judicial discretion.  A 
court should be able to consider the best interests and personal preferences, 
if discernable, of the woman.  Ultimately it is the woman who must be 
served.  Great deference should be given to “substituted judgment,” with a 
“best interests” standard used only when the woman’s intent cannot be 
discerned from her, her guardian, or her family.  
Expedition is also necessary for any court or administrative procedures 
put in place for seeking an abortion.  The Supreme Court recognized the 
need for expediency with regard to judicial bypass176 procedures and 
176. The judicial bypass procedure is directly analogous to a procedure for a woman with
diminished capacity seeking an abortion.  For such a woman, if her guardian cannot or will
not give consent for an abortion, or she does not have a court-appointed guardian, but she
still exhibits a desire to have the procedure and it is adjudged to be in her best interest, a
court should authorize the abortion.  One potential difficulty is the extent of the woman’s
mental incapacity.  For minors seeking an abortion using judicial bypass, it is guaranteed
that the woman, even if twelve years old, has reached the age of puberty.  The minor may
not fully understand the scope of her decisions, even if she is mature and informed, but she
may still be permitted to terminate the pregnancy.  Some women with diminished capacity,
on the other hand, especially those with intellectual disabilities, have fully mature bodies but
have not reached the mental age of puberty.  There is no doubt that abortion for these
women is tricky.  Nonetheless, like the best interests provision for minors using judicial
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appeals for minors seeking abortion.177  Delays can deny the minor an 
effective opportunity to obtain the abortion.178  Using judicial bypass as an 
established model, policies for incapacitated women’s access to abortion 
can be developed that are mindful of expediency.  Because a court order 
will often be necessary, the courts should hear the petitions ex parte as 
soon as possible and do all evaluations necessary with efficiency in mind to 
avoid problematic delays to the procedure.  Additionally, states should 
consider the practical effects of their abortion schemes to avoid de facto 
bans.  Women with diminished capacity seeking an abortion should be 
assisted in making transportation and other arrangements for the procedure 
if a guardian cannot.179  If funding is nonexistent, the state should assume 
the cost of her abortion.180  Without this basic assistance, abortion for these 
women may be possible in theory but impossible in practice. 
Finally, some level of court oversight is necessary to prevent a 
guardian from solely using his or her own judgment without accounting for 
any of the ward’s preferences.181  For a pregnant woman with diminished 
capacity and her guardian, there may be a conflict of interest.  Likely, the 
responsibility of raising the child would fall to her guardian, which may 
influence the guardian’s decision to terminate the pregnancy.182  Given that 
conflict, some judicial safeguard is appropriate, including the appointment 
of an impartial and independent guardian ad litem.183  A court petition and 
hearing process would also provide an avenue for women with diminished 
capacity but no court-appointed guardian to obtain an abortion.  The court 
could appoint and impartial and independent guardian ad litem specifically 
for the purpose of authorizing the woman’s abortion, the court could 
appoint a permanent guardian, or the court itself could evaluate the 
evidence and decide whether or not to authorize the abortion. 
Keeping these factors in mind, it is both possible and necessary to 
design a statutory and regulatory scheme so that women with diminished 
capacity can have abortions safely and expeditiously.  For women with 
guardians, the guardian should be able to directly exercise the right to 
abortion on behalf of the woman or do so after court permission, depending 
on the jurisdiction, so long as the process is clearly laid out in statutes, 
regulations, and/or case law.184  For women without guardians, a court 
bypass, it may sometimes be best for these women and their potential children to allow an 
abortion, so long as it is within the scope of an enumerated and accessible policy. 
177. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 513 (1990).
178. Id.
179. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lonzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 351–52 (3d Cir.
1987).
180. Id. at 351.
181. French, supra note 31, at 524.
182. Stefan, supra note 98, at 435–36.
183. Id.
184. French, supra note 31, at 524.
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should be able to appoint a guardian for the purpose of consenting to the 
abortion or the court should be able to authorize the abortion of its own 
accord, again provided the process is clear, comprehensive, and efficient. 
Abortion is an important aspect of female liberty and autonomy that should 
not be infringed solely because a woman cannot fully express self-
determination.185 
185. French, supra note 31, at 524.
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